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Abstract. We consider a voting setting where candidates have preferences about
the outcome of the election and are free to join or leave the election. The cor-
responding candidacy game, where candidates choose strategically to participate
or not, has been studied by Dutta et al. [6], who showed that no non-dictatorial
voting procedure satisfying unanimity is candidacy-strategyproof, that is, is such
that the joint action where all candidates enter the election is always a pure strat-
egy Nash equilibrium. In [7] Dutta et al. also showed that for some voting tree
procedures, there are candidacy games with no pure Nash equilibria, and that for
the rule that outputs the sophisticated winner of voting by successive elimination,
all games have a pure Nash equilibrium. No results were known about other vot-
ing rules. Here we prove several such results. For four candidates, the message is,
roughly, that most scoring rules (with the exception of Borda) do not guarantee
the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium but that Condorcet-consistent rules, for
an odd number of voters, do. For five candidates, most rules we study no longer
have this guarantee. Finally, we identify one prominent rule that guarantees the
existence of a pure Nash equilibrium for any number of candidates (and for an
odd number of voters): the Copeland rule. We also show that under mild assump-
tions on the voting rule, the existence of strong equilibria cannot be guaranteed.
1 Introduction
A main issue for the evaluation of voting rules is their ability to resist various sorts
of strategic behavior. Strategic behavior can come from the voters reporting insincere
votes (manipulation); from a third party, typically the chair, acting on the set of voters or
candidates (control), on the votes (bribery, lobbying), or on the voting rule (e.g., agenda
control). However, strategic behavior by the candidates has received less attention than
strategic behavior by the voters and (to a lesser extent) by the chair. One form thereof
involves choosing optimal political platforms. But probably the simplest form comes
from the ability of candidates to decide whether to run for the election or not, which is
the issue we address here. The following table summarizes this rough classification of
strategic behavior in voting, according to the identity of the strategizing agent(s) and to
another relevant dimension, namely what the strategic actions bear on—voters, votes or
candidates (we omit the agenda to keep the table small).
actions →
agents ↓ voters votes candidates
voters strategic participation manipulation -
third party / chair voter control bribery, lobbying candidate control,
cloning
candidates - - strategic candidacy
Strategic candidacy does happen frequently in real-life elections, both in large-scale
political elections and in small-scale, low-stake elections (e.g., electing a chair in a re-
search group, or—moving a little bit away from elections—reputation systems). Through-
out the paper we consider a finite set of potential candidates, which we simply call
candidates when this is not ambiguous, and we make the following assumptions:
1. each candidate may choose to run or not for the election;
2. each candidate has a preference ranking over candidates;
3. each candidate ranks himself on top of his ranking;
4. the candidates’ preferences are common knowledge among them;
5. the outcome of the election as a function of the set of candidates who choose to run
is common knowledge among the candidates.
With the exception of 3, these assumptions were also made in the original model
of Dutta et al. [6] which we discuss below. Assumption 2 amounts to saying that a
candidate is interested only in the winner of the election4 and has no indifferences or
incomparabilities. Assumption 3 (considered as optional in [6]) is a natural domain
restriction in most contexts. Assumptions 4 and 5 are common game-theoretic assump-
tions; note that we do not have to assume that the candidates know precisely how voters
will vote, nor even the number of voters; they just have to know the choice function
mapping every subset of candidates to a winner. Assumption 4 is required only when
strong Nash equilibria are considered.
Existing work on strategic candidacy is rather scarce. Dutta et al. [6,7] formulate
the strategic candidacy game and prove that no non-dictatorial voting procedure satis-
fying unanimity is candidacy-strategyproof (or equivalently, that for any non-dictatorial
voting procedure satisfying unanimity, there is a profile for which the joint action where
all candidates enter the election is not a pure Nash equilibrium). Then, Dutta et al. [7]
exhibit a (non-anonymous) voting tree rule for four candidates for which there is a can-
didacy game with no pure Nash equilibria. They also show that for the voting rule that
outputs the sophisticated outcome for voting by successive elimination, the existence
of a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed. Some of these results are discussed further
(together with simpler proofs) by Ehlers and Weymark [8], and extended to voting cor-
respondences by Ereslan [9] and Rodriguez [15], and to probabilistic voting rules by
Rodriguez [14]. Brill and Conitzer [4] extend the analysis to also include strategic be-
havior by the voters. Polukarov et al. [13] study equilibrium dynamics in candidacy
4 In some contexts, candidates may have more refined preferences that bear for instance on the
number of votes they get, how their score compares to that of other candidates, etc. We do not
consider these issues here.
games, in which candidates may strategically decide to enter the election or withdraw
their candidacy. Obraztsova et al. [12] study strategic candidacy games with lazy can-
didates, whose utility function results form the outcome of the election minus a small
penalty for running for election.
Studying the equilibria of a candidacy game helps predicting the set of actual candi-
dates and therefore the outcome of the vote. However, little is known about this: we only
know that for any reasonable voting rule, there are some candidacy games for which the
set of all candidates is not a pure Nash equilibrium, that there exist candidacy games
with no pure Nash equilibria, and that a specific rule, defined from the successive elimi-
nation procedure and assuming that voters reason by backward induction, all candidacy
games have a pure Nash equilibrium. We do not know, for instance, whether pure Nash
equilibria always exist for common voting rules such as plurality, Borda or Copeland.
In this paper, we go further in this direction and prove some positive as well as
some negative results. We first consider the case of four candidates and show that for an
odd number of voters, a pure Nash equilibrium always exists for Condorcet-consistent
rules, while for most scoring rules and as well as for single transferable vote and plu-
rality with runoff, this is not the case. Over the five candidate frontier, we know very
few rules that, can still guarantee the existence of an equilibrium. We show that for the
Copeland rule, and an odd number of voters, there is always a pure Nash equilibrium,
whichever the number of candidates. On the negative side, we show that for most scor-
ing rules, for at least four candidates, and for Borda, maximin, and the uncovered set
for at least five candidates, and for the top cycle with at least seven candidates, there are
candidacy games without pure Nash equilibria. We also prove a simple impossibility
theorem showing that strong Nash equilibria are not guaranteed to exist provided the
voting rule satisfies two mild conditions satisfied by most common rules.
The paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2 we define the strategic candidacy games
and give a few preliminary results. In Section 3 we focus on the case of four candidates.
The case of five candidates is considered in Section 4. Section 5 deals with candidacy
games with more candidates. In Section 6 we discuss strong Nash equilibria, and relate
the candidacy game to candidate control. Finally, in Section 7 we discuss further issues.
2 Model and preliminaries
In this section, we define the strategic candidacy model, show that it induces a normal
form game, and give preliminary results on the existence of Nash equilibria.
2.1 Voting rules
Let X = {x1, x2, . . . xm} be a set of potential candidates and N = {1, 2, . . . n} a set
of n voters. We assume n is odd, so that pairwise majority ties do not occur. While this
is a mild assumption when the number of voters is large, this implies a loss of generality
for some of our results, and when this is the case we will make it clear.
For any subset Y ⊆ X of the candidates, a Y -vote is a linear ordering over Y . A
Y -profile P = 〈≻1, . . . ,≻n〉 is a collection of n Y -votes. Although voting rules are
often defined for a fixed set of candidates, here we define them for an arbitrary subset
of the set of potential candidates: a (resolute) voting rule maps every Y -profile, for
every Y ⊆ X , to a candidate in Y . We will only consider resolute rules; we will first
define their irresolute version and then assume that ties are broken up according to a
fixed priority relation over the candidates. Because voting rules are applied to varying
sets of candidates, we assume that the tie-breaking rule is defined as a linear ordering
on the whole set of potential candidates X , and projected to subsets of candidates: if x
has priority over y (noted x⊲ y) when all potential candidates run, this will still be the
case for any set of candidates that contains x and y.
We now define the rules we will use in the paper. (For each of them we define its
irresolute version, its resolute version being obtained as explained above.)
Scoring rules. A scoring rule (for a varying set of candidates) is defined by a collection
of vectors Sm = 〈s1, . . . sm〉 for all m, with s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sm and s1 > sm. For
each m and each i ≤ m, si is the number of points obtained by the candidate ranked
in position i, and the winning candidate(s) maximizes the sum of points obtained from
all votes. Formally speaking, defining a family of scoring rules requires to specify a
scoring vector for each size of a candidate set (for instance, 〈3, 1, 0〉 for three candidates,
〈4, 3, 2, 0〉 for four candidates and so on). However, for the following classical rules,
these collections of vectors are defined in a natural way:
– plurality: Sm = 〈1, 0, . . .0〉;
– veto (or antiplurality): Sm = 〈1, . . . 1, 0〉;
– Borda: Sm = 〈m− 1,m− 2, . . . 1, 0〉.
Condorcet-consistent rules. Let P be a profile and NP (c, x) be the number of votes in
P who rank c above x. The majority graph m(P ) associated with P is the graph whose
vertices are the candidates and containing an edge from x to y whenever NP (x, y) > n2
(we say that x beats y in m(P ), denoted by x →P y). Because n is odd, m(P ) is a
tournament, i.e, a complete asymmetric graph. A candidate c is a Condorcet winner if
c→P y for all y 6= c. A voting rule r is Condorcet-consistent if r(P ) = {c} whenever
there is a (unique) Condorcet winner c for P .
Given a profile P , the top cycle TC(P ) is the smallest S ⊆ X such that for every
x ∈ S and y ∈ X \ S, x →P y . The uncovered set UC(P ) is the set S ⊆ X of
candidates such that for any c ∈ S and for any other candidate x, if x→P c then there
is some y such that c →P y and y →P x. The maximin rule chooses the candidate(s)
c that maximize minx∈X\{c}NP (c, x). The Copeland rule chooses the candidate(s) c
that maximize |{x ∈ X |c→P x}|.
Rules based on iterative elimination of candidates. Plurality with runoff proceeds in
two rounds: we first select the two candidates x and y with highest plurality scores and
the second round chooses between them according to majority. Single transferable vote
(STV) proceeds in m− 1 rounds: at each round, the candidate with the lowest plurality
score among the remaining candidates (using tie-breaking if necessary) is eliminated.
2.2 Strategic candidacy
In addition to voters’ preferences over candidates, expressed by the voter profile P , we
assume that each candidate i too has a linear preference ordering ≻i over candidates.
We assume furthermore that the candidates’ preferences are self-supported—that is,
each candidates rank herself at the top of her ranking. Let PX = (PXc )c∈X denote the
candidates’ preference profile.
We assume that voters are sincere; therefore, when the set of candidates running
for election is Y ⊆ X , each voter i reports the restriction of ≻i to Y and the obtained
profile, denoted by P ↓Y , is the restriction of P to Y .
Given a fixed voter profile P , a voting rule r can be seen as mapping each Y ⊆ X
to a winner r(P ↓Y ) in Y . We use the notation Y 7→P,r x, or more simply, Y 7→ x when
there is no ambiguity, to denote that the outcome of rule r applied to profile P restricted
to the subset of candidates Y ⊆ X is x.
Each voting rule r induces a natural game form, where the set of players is given
by the set of potential candidates X , and the strategy set available to each player is
{0, 1} with 1 corresponding to entering the election and 0 standing for withdrawal of
candidacy. A state s of the game is a vector of strategies (sc)c∈X , where sc ∈ {0, 1}.
For convenience, we use s−z to denote (sc)c∈X\{z}—i.e., s reduced by the single entry
of player z. Similarly, for a state swe use sZ to denote the strategy choices of a coalition
Z ⊆ X and s−Z for the complement, and we write s = (sZ , s−Z).
The outcome of a state s is r
(
P ↓Y
)
where c ∈ Y if and only if sc = 1.5 Coupled
with a voter profile P and a candidate profile PX , this defines a normal form game
Γ = 〈X,P, r, PX〉 with m players. Here, player c prefers outcome Γ (s) over outcome
Γ (s′) if ordering PXc ranks Γ (s) above Γ (s′).
2.3 Game-theoretic concepts
Having defined a normal form game, we can now apply standard game-theoretic solu-
tion concepts. Let Γ = 〈X,P, r, PX〉 be a candidacy game, and let s be a state in Γ .
We say that a coalition Z ⊆ X has an improving move in s if there is s′Z such that
Γ (s−Z , s
′
Z) is preferred to Γ (s) by every z ∈ Z . In particular, the improving move is
unilateral if |Z| = 1. A state is a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium (NE) if it has no
unilateral improving moves, and a k-NE if no coalition with |Z| ≤ k has an improving
move. A strong Nash equilibrium (SE) [1] is a state with no improving moves.
Example 1. Consider the game 〈{a, b, c, d}, P, r, PX〉, where r is the Borda rule, and
P and PX are as follows:6
P PX
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
b c c a d b a
d d d c a c b
a a b b c d c
c b a d b a d
a b c d
a b c d
d a b a
b d a c
c c d b
5 When clear from the context, we use vector s to also denote the set of candidates Y that cor-
responds to state s; e.g., if X = {x1, x2, x3}, we note {x1, x3} and (1,0,1) interchangeably.
6 In our examples, when the tie-breaking ordering is not specified it is assumed to be lexico-
graphic. We generally omit curly brackets. The first row in P indicates the number of voters
casting the different ballots. We use the common convention of writing votes vertically, with
the topmost candidate being preferred.
The state (1,1,1,1) is not an NE: abcd 7→ c, but abc 7→ a, and d prefers a to c, so for
d, leaving is an improving move. Now, (1,1,1,0) is an NE, as noone has an improving
move neither by joining (d prefers a over c), or by leaving (obviously not a; if b or c
leaves then the winner is still a). It can be checked that this is also an SE.
2.4 Preliminary results
Regardless of the number of voters and the voting rule used, a straightforward obser-
vation is that a candidacy game with three candidates is guaranteed to possess an NE.
Note that this does not hold for SE.7
The first question which comes to mind is whether examples showing the absence
of NE transfer to larger set of candidates. They indeed do, under an extremely mild
assumption. We say that a voting rule is insensitive to bottom-ranked candidates (IBC)
if given any profile P over X = {x1, . . . , xm}, if P ′ is the profile over X ∪ {xm+1}
obtained by adding xm+1 at the bottom of every vote of P , then r(P ′) = r(P ). This
property is extremely weak (much weaker than Pareto efficiency) and is satisfied by
almost all ‘common’ voting rules.
Lemma 1. For any voting rule r satisfying IBC, if there exists Γ = 〈X,P, r, PX〉 with
no NE, then there exists Γ ′ = 〈X ′, P ′, r, P Y 〉 with no NE, where |X ′| = |X |+ 1.
Proof. Take Γ with no NE, with X = {x1, . . . , xm}. Let X ′ = X ∪ {xm+1}, P ′ the
profile obtained from P by adding xm+1 at the bottom of every vote, and PX
′ be the
candidate profile obtained by adding xm+1 at the bottom of every ranking of a candidate
xi, i < m, and whatever ranking for xm+1. Let Y ⊆ X . Because Y is not an NE for
Γ , some candidate xi ∈ X has an interest to leave or to join, therefore Y is not an NE
either for Γ ′. Now, consider Y ′ = Y ∪ {xm+1}. If xi ∈ X has an interest to leave
(resp., join) Y , then because r satisfies IBC, the winner in Y ′ \ {xi} (resp., Y ′ ∪ {xi})
is the same as in Y \ {xi} (resp., Y ∪ {xi}), therefore xi ∈ X has an interest to leave
(resp., join) Y ′, therefore Y ′ is not an NE. 
We will use this induction lemma to extend some of our negative results to an ar-
bitrary number of candidates. A noticeable exception is the veto rule, which does not
satisfy IBC. In Appendix A we provide a specific lemma to handle this rule.
The following result applies to any number of candidates and Condorcet-consistent
rules.
Proposition 1. Let Γ = 〈X,P, r, PX〉 be a candidacy game where r is Condorcet-
consistent. If P has a Condorcet winner c then for any Y ⊆ X ,
Y is an SE ⇔ Y is an NE ⇔ c ∈ Y .
The very easy proof can be found in Appendix A. If P has no Condorcet winner, the
analysis becomes more complicated. We provide results for this more general case in
the following sections.
7 Here is a counterexample (communicated to us by Markus Brill). The selection rule is abc 7→
b; ab 7→ a; ac 7→ c; bc 7→ c; it can be easily implemented by the scoring rule with scoring
vector (5, 4, 0〉 with 5 voters. Preferences of candidates are: a : a ≻ b ≻ c; b : b ≻ c ≻ a; c :
c ≻ a ≻ b. The group deviations are: in {a, b, c}, c leaves; in {a, b}, b leaves and c joins; in
{a, c}, b joins; in {b, c}, a joins; in {a}, c joins; in {b}, c joins; in {c}, a and b join.
3 The first frontier: four candidates
With only four potential candidates, we exhibit a sharp contrast between the Condorcet-
consistent rules, for which a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist (for odd n), and
many other voting rules.
3.1 Scoring rules
We make use of a powerful result by Saari [16] which states that for almost all scoring
rules, any choice function can result from a voting profile. For four candidates [17], we
define a Saari rule as a rule for which, when the scoring vector for three candidates is of
the form 〈w1, w2, 0〉, then the vector for four candidates is not 〈3w1, w1+2w2, 2w2, 0〉.
For instance, plurality and veto are Saari rules, but the Borda rule is not a Saari rule. For
any Saari rule, any choice function can result from a voting profile [16,17]. This means
that our question boils down to check whether a choice function, together with some
coherent candidates’ preferences, can be found such that no NE exists with four candi-
dates. We solved this question by encoding the problem as an Integer Linear Program
(ILP), the details of which can be found in Appendix B.
It turns out that such choice functions do exist. We depict one of them in Figure 1
(where arrows denote deviations and the right part of each cell denotes the winner),
which rules out the existence of an NE when taken with the candidates preferences:
a : a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d
b : b ≻ a ≻ c ≻ d
c : c ≻ d ≻ a ≻ b
d : d ≻ a ≻ b ≻ c
abcd|d
abc|c abd|b acd|a bcd|d
ab|a ac|cad|d bc|b bd|bcd|c
a|a b|b c|c d|d
Fig. 1. A choice function without NE
The following result then follows directly.
Proposition 2. For four candidates, if r is a Saari rule, there are candidacy games
without Nash equilibria.
As a corollary, we get that:
Corollary 1. For plurality, veto (and more generally, for k-approval with any k), there
are candidacy games without NE.
Note that Saari’s result shows that counter-examples can be obtained for all these
scoring rules, but it does not directly provide the profile satisfying this choice function.
These profiles may involve a large number of voters. For plurality, we exhibit a profile
with 13 voters corresponding to the choice function given in Fig. 1, whose preferences
are shown on the left part of the table below. The right part of the table represents PX .
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
d d d a a a b b c
c b a b c d c a b
a c b c b b d c d
b a c d d c a d a
a b c d
a b c d
b a d a
c c a b
d d b c
Similar profiles can be obtained for other Saari rules. As for the Borda rule, which is
not a Saari rule, it stands as an exception:
Proposition 3. For Borda and m = 4, every candidacy game has an NE.
This result was obtained by a translation into an integer linear program, then run on
a computer. It relies on the fact that Borda rule can be computed from the weighted
majority graph, and by adding the corresponding constraints into the ILP (for the details
of this ILP, see Appendix B). The infeasibility of the resulting set of constraints shows
that no instances without NE can be constructed.
However, it takes only coalitions of pairs of agents to ruin this stability. Indeed, for
Borda and m = 4, there are candidacy games without 2-NE. This can be seen on the
following candidacy game:
1 1 1 1 1
b c d a b
d d a b c
c a c c d
a b b d a
a b c d
a b c d
c a a b
d c d a
b d b c
Only s1 = (0, 1, 1, 1) and s2 = (1, 1, 0, 1) are NE, with bcd 7→ b, and abd 7→ d. From
s1 the coalition {a, c} has an improving move to s2 as they both prefer d to b. From s2,
if b leaves and c joins, they reach (1, 0, 1, 1), with acd 7→ c and both prefer c to d.
3.2 Rules based on successive elimination
Let us now focus on plurality with runoff and single transferable vote. For these rules,
it is no longer the case that any choice function can be implemented by such rules. For
instance, for plurality with runoff, a necessary condition for the choice function to be
implementable is that, for any subset of candidates Y , |Y | ≥ 3, if r(Y ) = x, then
x must win in pairwise comparison against some candidate y ∈ Y \ {x}. For STV, a
stronger condition is even required: for any subset of candidates Y , if r(Y ) = x, it must
be the case that r(Z) = x for some set Z ⊂ Y such that |Z| = |Y − 1|.
We make no claim that these conditions are sufficient to ensure a possible imple-
mentation. However, by adding these constraints into our ILP, we generated a choice
function that we could in turn implement with a specific profile, thus providing us the
following result.
Proposition 4. For plurality with runoff and single transferable vote and m = 4, there
are candidacy games without NE.
Proof. We exhibit a counter-example with 9 voters. The tie-breaking is d⊲ a⊲ c⊲ b.
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
a a b b b c c d d
c d a c d b d a c
b b c a c d a b a
d c d d a a b c b
a b c d
a b c d
b a a a
d c b c
c d d b

3.3 Condorcet-consistent rules
We now turn our attention to Condorcet-consistent rules. We recall that we assume the
number of voters n to be odd.
Proposition 5. For m = 4 (and n odd), if r is Condorcet-consistent then every candi-
dacy game has an NE.
Proof. For any profile P , let GP the complete tournament obtained from the majority
graph associated with P . Although we do not assume that r is based on the majority
graph, we nevertheless prove our result by considering all possible tournaments on four
candidates (we shall get back to this point at the end of the proof). In the proof, when
we speak of an “NE in G” we mean an NE in any candidacy game for which the profile
P is associated with the majority graph G. There are four tournaments to consider (all
others are obtained from these ones by symmetry).
a b
c d
G1
a b
c d
G2
a b
c d
G3
a b
c d
G4
For G1 and G2, any subset of X containing the Condorcet winner is an NE (see
Proposition 1). For G3, we note that a is a Condorcet loser. That is, N(a, x) < N(x, a)
for all x ∈ {b, c, d}. Note that in this case, there is no Condorcet winner in the reduced
profile P ↓{b,c,d} as this would imply the existence of a Condorcet winner in P (case G1
or G2). W.l.o.g., assume that b beats c, c beats d, and d beats b. W.l.o.g. again, assume
that bcd 7→ b. Then, {b, c} is an NE. Indeed, in any set of just two candidates, none has
an incentive to leave. Now, a or d have no incentive to join as this would not change the
winner: in the former case, observe that b is the (unique) Condorcet winner in P ↓{a,b,c},
and the latter follows by our assumption. There is always an NE for G3.
The proof for G4 is more complex and proceeds case by case. Since r is Condorcet-
consistent, we have acd 7→ a, bcd 7→ c, ab 7→ b, ac 7→ a, ad 7→ a, bc 7→ c, bd 7→ d and
cd 7→ c. The sets of candidates for which r is undetermined are abcd, abc and abd.
We have the following easy facts: (i) if abcd 7→ a then acd is an NE, (ii) if abcd 7→ c
then bcd is an NE, (iii) if abc 7→ a then ac is an NE, (iv) if abd 7→ a then ad is an NE,
(v) if abc 7→ c then bc is an NE. The only remaining cases are:
1. abcd 7→ b, abc 7→ b, abd 7→ b.
2. abcd 7→ b, abc 7→ b, abd 7→ d.
3. abcd 7→ d, abc 7→ b, abd 7→ b.
4. abcd 7→ d, abc 7→ b, abd 7→ d.
In cases 1 and 3, ab is an NE. In case 2, if a prefers b to c then abc is an NE, and if
a prefers c to b, then bcd is an NE. In case 4, if a prefers c to d, then bcd is an NE; if
b prefers a to d, then ad is an NE; finally, if a prefers d to c and b prefers d to a, then
abcd is an NE. To conclude, observe that the proof never uses the fact that two profiles
having the same majority graph have the same winner.8 
Thus, the picture for four candidates shows a sharp contrast. On one hand, we show
that “almost all scoring rules” [16], single transferable vote, and plurality with run-off,
may fail to have an NE. On the other hand, Condorcet-consistency alone suffices to
guarantee the existence of an NE.
4 The second frontier: five candidates
We start with scoring rules. Recall that for four candidates we had the non-existence
results for most rules, with Borda being a noticeable exception. We now show that five
candidates is enough for Borda to lose this guarantee of the existence of NE.
Proposition 6. For the Borda rule, with five candidates, there are candidacy games
without Nash equilibria.
Proof. The following counterexample has been obtained by applying the same ILP
technique as described in the previous section. We do not give the profile but only
its majority margin matrix, where the number corresponding to row x and column y is
NP (x, y) − NP (y, x); by Debord’s theorem [5], the existence of a profile P realizing
this matrix is guaranteed because all elements of the matrix have the same parity.
8 For instance, we may have two profiles P , P ′ both corresponding to G4, such that r(P ) = a
and r(P ′) = b; the proof perfectly works in such a case.
a b c d e
a − −3 −1 +1 +3
b +3 − −5 +1 −1
c +1 +5 − −5 −1
d −1 −1 +5 − −3
e −3 +1 +1 +3 −
a b c d e
a b c d e
b a a c c
e e d e d
c c e a a
d d b b b
Below we give the explicit listing of all 31 states, introducing a notation that we shall
use throughout the paper: the outcome of the choice function (the winner in each state)
is given in boldface, and a deviation from this state is given next to each state, where
x+ (respectively x−) means that x has a profitable deviation by joining (respectively,
by leaving) this state. It can be seen that none of the 31 states is an NE.
a b+
b c+
c d+
d e+
e a+
ab c+
ac d+
ad b+
ae b+
bc d+
bd e+
be c+
cd e+
ce a+
de a+
abc d+
abd c+
abe c+
acd c−
ace e−
ade b+
bcd e+
bce b−
bde a+
cde a+
abcd e+
abce b−
abde c+
acde e−
bcde d−
abcde b−

Recall that for Condorcet-consistent rules, the existence of NE is guaranteed for
four candidates. For the maximin rule and the uncovered set rule, this existence result
stops at four. The proof, consisting of two counterexamples, is in Appendix A.
Proposition 7. For the maximin rule and the uncovered set rule, with five candidates,
there are candidacy games without NE.
However, this negative result does not extend to all Condorcet-consistent rules, as
shown in Proposition 8 below (and also in Proposition 9 in the following section).
Proposition 8. For the Top-Cycle rule, with five candidates, every candidacy game has
a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let P be a profile overX = {a, b, c, d, e} and without loss of generality, assume
that the tie-breaking priority ranks a above all other candidates. If |TC(P )| ≤ 4 then
consider the restriction P ↓TC(P ) of P to TC(P ). It is a q-candidate profile for q ≤ 4,
therefore by Proposition 5 the corresponding candidacy game has an NE Z ⊆ TC(P ).
Because it is an NE in P ↓TC(P ), no candidate in TC(P ) has an incentive to deviate.
Now, if a candidate in X \ TC(P ) joins, the outcome does not change, therefore no
candidate outside TC(P ) has an incentive to join. Therefore, Z is an NE for P .
Assume now that TC(P ) = {a, b, c, d, e}; this implies TCt(P ) = a. Without loss
of generality, assume the majority graph contains a→ b→ c→ d→ e→ a. For abcde
not to be an NE, a withdrawing agent x has to induce a new top-cycle not containing a.
If this top-cycle is a singleton, then X \ {x} is an NE. Therefore, the top-cycle after the
withdrawal of x must be of size 3: it can only be {c, d, e}, with b withdrawing because
it prefers the most prioritary candidate (let us call it y) among {c, d, e} to a. At this
stage, we know that d → a, c → a, e → a, c → d → e → c, and that the winner in
acde is y. Observe that, irrespective of the tie-breaking winner, a cannot leave because
the winner would remain the same. There are thus three cases to consider:
– Case 1: y = c. Consider acd 7→ c. Since ac 7→ c, cd 7→ c, and acde 7→ c, acd is
not an NE only if b wants to join; but abcd 7→ a, and b prefers c to a: bcd is an NE.
– Case 2: y = e. Consider ace 7→ e. Since ae 7→ e, ce 7→ e, and acde 7→ e, ace is
not an NE only if b wants to join. For this to be possible, we must have b→ e, and
then abce 7→ a. But in this case, since abc 7→ a, abe 7→ a, and abcde 7→ a, abce is
an NE. Therefore, either ace or abce is an NE.
– Case 3: y = d. Consider ade 7→ d. Since ad 7→ d, de 7→ d and acde 7→ d, ade is
not an NE only if b wants to join. For this to be possible, it must be that b→ d (and
b prefers a over d). Thus abde 7→ a. In this case, since abd 7→ a and abcde 7→ a,
abde is not an NE only if d wants to leave. This is possible only if e → b (and d
prefers e over a). But then abe 7→ e, ae 7→ e, be 7→ e, and abce 7→ e: abde is an
NE. Therefore, either ade or abde is an NE. 
5 More candidates
In this section, we present our results for a general number of candidates.
5.1 A positive result: Copeland
We show the existence of NE for Copeland, under deterministic tie-breaking, for any
number of candidates (provided n is odd).
Proposition 9. For Copeland, for any number of candidates and an odd number of
voters, every candidacy game has an NE.
Proof. Let P be a profile and →P its associated majority graph. Let C(x, P ) be the
number of candidates y 6= x such that x→P y. The Copeland cowinners for P are the
candidates maximizing C(·, P ).
Let Cop(P ) be the set of Copeland cowinners for P and let c be the Copeland
winner—i.e., the most prioritary candidate in Cop(P ). Consider Dom(c) = {c} ∪
{y|c→P y}. Note that C
(
c, P ↓Dom(c)
)
= |Dom(c)| − 1 = q ≥ C(c, P ). Also, since
any y ∈ Dom(c) is beaten by c, we have C(y, P ↓Dom(c)) ≤ q − 1.
We claim that Dom(c) is an NE. Note that c is a Condorcet winner in the restriction
of P to Dom(c), and a fortiori, in the restriction of P to any subset of Dom(c). Hence,
c is the Copeland winner in Dom(c) and any of its subsets, and no candidate inDom(c)
has an incentive to leave.
Now, assume there is a candidate z ∈ X\Dom(c) such that r
(
P ↓Dom(c)∪{z}
)
6= c.
Note that z →P c as z does not belong to Dom(c); so, C(c, P ↓Dom(c)∪{z}) = q.
For any y ∈ Dom(c) we have C(y, P ↓Dom(c)∪{z}) ≤ (q − 1) + 1 = q =
C(c, P ↓Dom(c)∪{z}). If C
(
y, P ↓Dom(c)∪{z}
)
< C(c, P ↓Dom(c)∪{z}), then y is not the
Copeland winner in P ↓Dom(c)∪{z}. If C
(
y, P ↓Dom(c)∪{z}
)
= C
(
c, P ↓Dom(c)∪{z}
)
,
then C(y, P ) ≥ C(c, P ). That is, either c /∈ Cop(P ), a contradiction, or both y, c
are in Cop(P ). The latter implies c ⊲ y; hence, y is not the Copeland winner in
P ↓Dom(c)∪{z}.
Hence, r
(
P ↓Dom(c)∪{z}
)
= z. That is, either (1) C (z, P ↓Dom(c)∪{z}) > q, or
(2) C (z, P ↓Dom(c)∪{z}) = q and z ⊲ c. If (1) holds then C(z, P ) > C(c, P ), which
contradicts the fact that c is the Copeland winner in P . If (2) holds then C(z, P ) =
C(c, P )—i.e., both c and z are in Cop(P ), which implies that c ⊲ z, and z cannot win
in P ↓Dom(c)∪{z}. Therefore, the Copeland winner in P ↓Dom(c)∪{z} is c, which implies
that z has no incentive to join Dom(c). 
Note that not only the existence of an NE is guaranteed, but also the existence of an
NE where the winner is the same winner as on the original profile (that is, the Copeland
winner of the profile with all candidates running).9
When n is even, the result carries on if no pairwise majority ties occur. In the general
case, however, the result depends on the way ties are taken into account for computing
the Copeland score of a candidate. For the variant Copeland0 where the Copeland score
remains the number of outgoing edges (ties not giving any point), the result still holds.
Whether it holds for other variants is an open question.
5.2 Top Cycle
Proposition 10. For the Top-Cycle rule, with six candidates, every candidacy game has
an NE, and with seven candidates, there are candidacy games without an NE.
Both results have been obtained by computer search. Technically, we first pruned the
domain to reduce the number of majority graphs to consider. Then, for each remaining
graph, we computed the co-winners given by the top-cycle rule, and we launched a
feasibility problem asking the computer to build an instance without equilibrium. This
is similar in spirit to the ones used in previous sections, but including additional decision
variables for the tie-breaking ordering (and making sure that winners are indeed among
the co-winners). For the six candidate case, the infeasibility of the program tells us
that an equilibrium always exists, but we could not extract any readable proof from the
result.10 The counterexample for seven candidates is given in Appendix A.
9 Note however that this does not imply that the set of all candidates is an NE. For instance,
let X = {a, b, c, d}, and consider the majority graph a → b, a → c; b → c, b → d; d →
a, d → c, with the tie-breaking priority relation a⊲ b⊲ c ⊲ d. The Copeland winner is a (by
tie-breaking). We only need to specify that b : d ≻ a on top of self-supported preferences. X
is not an NE, because it is a profitable deviation for b to leave.
10 Note that this positive result holds as well for the Banks rule, since Top-Cycle and Banks do
coincide up to six candidates [3].
5.3 More negative results by induction
For all rules that satisfy IBC and for which we have already found a counter-example for
m, we know that counterexamples exist for any number of candidates. As we previously
noted, veto is an example of a rule not satisfying IBC, but an adapted version of Lemma
1 can easily be designed (see Lemma 2 in Appendix). As a corollary of these, and of
Propositions 1, 4, 7, 6 and 10 we get:
Corollary 2. There exists profiles with no NE in the following cases:
– For all Saari scoring rules satisfying IBC (including plurality), as well as for veto,
for all m ≥ 4.
– For plurality with runoff and single transferable vote, for all m ≥ 4.
– For Borda, maximin, and the uncovered set, for all m ≥ 5.
– For TopCycle, and for all m ≥ 7.
6 Strong Equilibria and Link to Control
6.1 Strong Nash Equilibria
We now prove that the lack of guarantee for the existence of strong Nash equlilibria
holds for almost any voting rule and any number of candidates m ≥ 3.
Let r be a voting rule defined for a varying set of candidates Y ⊆ X . We say that r
is majority-extending if for any Y ⊆ X such that |Y | = 2 and if the two candidates in
Y are not tied in P ↓Y then r(P ↓Y ) is the majority winner in P ↓Y (in case of a tie, we
don’t need to specify the outcome).
Proposition 11. There does not exist any majority-extending and IBC rule that guar-
antees the existence of an SE at every profile.
Proof. Let r be a majority-extending and IBC rule. Consider the following 3-voter,
k + 3-candidate profile (k ≥ 0):
1 1 1
a b c
b c a
c a b
x1 x1 x1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
xk xk xk
By a repeated application of IBC, for any nonempty Y ⊆ {a, b, c} and any Z ⊆
{x1, . . . , xk} we have r(P ↓Y ∪Z) = r(P Y ).
We already know that r(P ↓{a,b,c,x1,...,xk} ∈ {a, b, c}. Without loss of generality,
assume that r(P ↓{a,b,c,x1,...,xk}) = a. For anyZ ⊆ {x1, . . . , xk}, by IBC and majority-
extension, the resulting choice function must be:
abcZ 7→ a; abZ 7→ a; bcZ 7→ b; acZ 7→ c; aZ 7→ a; bZ 7→ b; cZ 7→ c
But then, given the candidates’ preferences, for any Z ⊆ {x1, . . . , xk} we have:
– abcZ is not an SE: abcZ 7→ a, b leaves 7→ c
– abZ is not an SE: abZ 7→ a, b leaves and c joins 7→ c
– acZ is not an SE: acZ 7→ c, a leaves and b joins 7→ b
– bcZ is not an SE: bcZ 7→ b, a joins 7→ a
– aZ is not an SE: aZ 7→ a, c joins 7→ c
– bZ is not an SE: bZ 7→ b, a joins 7→ a
– cZ is not an SE: cZ 7→ c, b joins 7→ b
– Z is not an SE: any of a, b or c wants to join. 
The result applies to most common voting rules.11
6.2 Relation to Control
Bartholdi et al. [2] define constructive control by deleting candidates (CCDC) and con-
structive control by adding candidates (CCAC): an instance of CCDC consists of a
profile P over set of candidatesC, a distinguished candidate c, an integer k, and we ask
whether there is a subset C′ of C with |C \ C′| ≤ k such that c is the unique winner
in C′. An instance of CCAC consists of a profile P over set of candidates C1 ∪ C2, a
distinguished candidate c, and we ask whether there is a subset C′ of C2 such that the
unique winner in C1 ∪ C′ is c. Destructive versions of control are defined by Hemas-
paandra et al. [11]: destructive control by deleting (DCDC) is similar to CCDC, except
that we ask whether there is a subset C′ of C \ {c} with |C \C′| ≤ k such that c is not
the unique winner in C \ C′; and destructive control by adding candidates (DCAC) is
similar to CCAC, except that c should not be the unique winner in C′. There are also
multimode versions of control [10]: e.g., CC(DC+AC) allows the chair to delete some
candidates and to add some others (subject to some cardinality constraints).
Nash equilibria and strong equilibria in strategic candidacy relate to a slightly more
demanding notion of control, which we can call consenting control, and that we find an
interesting notion per se. In traditional control, candidates have no preferences and no
choice—the chair may add or delete them as he likes. An instance of consenting CCDC
consists of an instance of CCDC plus, for each candidate in C, a preference ranking
over C, and we ask whether there is a subset C′ of C with |C \ C′| ≤ k such that c
is the unique winner in C′, and every candidate in C \ C′ prefers c to the candidate
which would win if all candidates in C were running. An instance of consenting CCAC
consists of an instance of CCAC plus, for each candidate in C2, a ranking over C1∪C2,
and we ask whether there is a subset C′ of C2 such that c is the unique winner in
C1∪C
′ and every candidate in C′ prefers c to the candidate which would win if only the
candidates in C1 were running. Consenting versions of destructive control are defined
similarly: here the goal is to have a different candidate from the current winner elected.
Clearly, for profile P , (1, . . . , 1) is an SE iff there is no consenting destructive con-
trol by removing candidates against the current winner r(X), with the value of k being
fixed to m (the chair has no limit on the number of candidates to be deleted; the limits
come here from the fact that the candidates must consent), and (1, . . . , 1) is an NE iff
11 A noticeable exception is veto; however, we already know that for veto, there exist profiles
without NE, and therefore without SE.
there is no consenting destructive control by removing candidates against the current
winner r(X), with the upper bound of k = 1 on the number of candidates to be deleted.
For candidate sets that are different from the set X of all candidates (as some may
leave and some other may join), we have to resort to consenting destructive control by
removing and adding candidates, as in [10]. Let s be a state and Xs the set of running
candidate in s: s is an SE if there is no consenting destructive control by removing
and adding candidates against the current winner r(Xs), without any constraint on the
number of candidates to be removed or added. For an NE, this is similar, but with the
bound k = 1 on the number of candidates to be deleted or added.
7 Conclusions
We have explored further the landscape of strategic candidacy in elections by obtaining
several positive results and several negative results which can be summarized on the
following table, where “yes∗” means yes under the assumption that n is odd, or more
generally that pairwise ties do not occur.
3 4 5-6 ≥ 7
plurality yes no no no
veto yes no no no
pl. runoff yes no no no
STV yes no no no
Borda yes yes no no
maximin yes yes∗ no no
UC yes yes∗ no no
TC yes yes∗ yes∗ no
Copeland yes yes∗ yes∗ yes∗
An important issue for further research is a characterization of all rules for which
the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed, at least for an odd number
of voters. We know that not only it contains Copeland, as well as the rule defiend by
the sophisticated winner of the successive elimination rule; these two rules do not have
much in common, which suggests that such a characterization could be highly complex.
Another issue is the study of the set of states that can be reached by some (e.g.
best response) dynamics starting from the set or all potential candidates. In some cases,
even when the existence of NE is guaranteed (e.g. for Copeland), we could already
come up with examples such that none is reachable by a sequence of best responses.
But other types of dynamics may be studied. Another issue for further research is the
computational complexity of deciding whether there is an NE or SE.
Finally, a recent line of research, dealing with a setting where not only candidates,
but also voters, are strategic players, has been investigated by Brill and Conitzer [4].
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Appendix A
Proposition 1 Let Γ = 〈X,P, r, PX〉 be a candidacy game where r is Condorcet-
consistent. If P has a Condorcet winner c then for any Y ⊆ X ,
Y is a SE ⇔ Y is an NE ⇔ c ∈ Y .
Proof. Assume c is a Condorcet winner for P and let Y ⊆ X such that c ∈ Y . Be-
cause r is Condorcet-consistent, and because c is a Condorcet winner for P ↓Y , we have
r
(
P ↓Y
)
= c. Assume Z = Z+∪Z− is a deviating coalition from Y , with Z+ the can-
didates who join andZ− the candidates who leave the election. Clearly, c /∈ Z , as c ∈ Y
and c has no interest to leave. Therefore, c is still a Condorcet winner in P ↓(Y \Z−)∪Z+ ,
which by the Condorcet-consistency of r implies that r
(
P ↓(Y \Z
−)∪Z+
)
= c, which
contradicts the assumption that Z wants to deviate. We thus conclude that Y is an SE,
and a fortiori an NE. Finally, let Y ⊆ X such that c /∈ Y . Then, Y is not an NE (and a
fortiori not an SE), because c has an interest to join the election. 
Proposition 7 For maximin and the uncovered set, with five candidates, there are pro-
files with no NE.
Proof. For maximin, a counterexample is the following weighted majority graph along
with the candidates’ preference profile. The tie-breaking priority is lexicographic.
a b c d e
a − 1 4 2 3
b 4 − 1 4 3
c 1 4 − 2 2
d 3 1 3 − 0
e 2 2 3 5 −
a b c d e
a b c d e
c e d a b
b c a c a
e a e b d
d d b e c
Below we give all 31 states, with the usual notation.
a b+
b c+
c a+
d b+
e a+
ab c+
ac d+
ad b+
ae b+
bc a+
bd c+
be c+
cd b+
ce a+
de a+
abc e+
abd c+
abe c+
acd b+
ace b+
ade b+
bcd a+
bce b−
bde c+
cde a+
abcd e+
abce a−
abde c+
acde b+
bcde b−
abcde a−
Here is now a counter-example for the uncovered set rule. The tie-breaking rule is
a⊲ b⊲ d⊲ c⊲ e.
a b c d e
a 0 0 0 1 0
b 1 0 1 0 0
c 1 0 0 1 0
d 0 1 0 0 1
e 1 1 1 0 0
a b c d e
a b c d e
e e e b b
c c d a a
b a a e c
d d b c d
a b+
b d+
c b+
d a+
e d+
ab e+
ac b+
ad c+
ae d+
bc e+
bd a+
be d+
cd b+
ce d+
de a+
abc e+
abd d−
abe d+
acd b+
ace d+
ade c+
bcd c−
bce d+
bde a+
cde e−
abcd a−
abce d+
abde c+
acde e−
bcde e−
abcde e−

Proposition 10 For the Top-Cycle rule and seven candidates, there are profiles with no
NE.
Proof. We give the majority graph, tie-breaking relation, and the (partially specified)
candidates’ preferences. The tie-breaking relation is a⊲ g ⊲ c⊲ b⊲ d⊲ e⊲ f .
a
b c
d
e
fg
a b c d e f g
a b c d e f g
c d c g
f b f d
g a g a
a f b b
d e e c
e g a f
a g+
b a+
c f+
d c+
e c+
f e+
g e+
ab f+
ac f+
ad c+
ae d+
af e+
ag e+
bc a+
bd a+
be c+
bf e+
bg f+
cd g+
ce g+
cf e+
cg f+
de c+
df e+
dg f+
ef c+
eg d+
fg e+
abc f+
abd f+
abe c+
abf e+
abg f+
acd f+
ace g+
acf e+
acg f+
ade c+
adf e+
adg f+
aef d+
aeg d+
afg e+
bcd f+
bce g+
bcf e+
bcg f+
bde c+
bdf e+
bdg a+
bef c+
beg d+
bfg e+
cde g+
cdf e+
cdg c−
cef g+
ceg c−
cfg d+
def b+
deg b+
dfg e+
efg d+
abcd f+
abce b−
abcf e+
abcg f+
abde d−
abdf e+
abdg f+
abef c+
abeg c+
abfg e+
acde g+
acdf e+
acdg c−
acef g+
aceg c−
acfg e+
adef c+
adeg b+
adfg e+
aefg d+
bcde e−
bcdf e+
bcdg a+
bcef g+
bceg a+
bcfg e+
bdef a+
bdeg a+
bdfg e+
befg d+
cdef g+
cdeg c−
cdfg e+
cefg c−
defg b+
abcde b−
abcdf e+
abcdg f+
abcef b−
abceg b−
abcfg e+
abdef d−
abdeg d−
abdfg e+
abefg c+
acdef g+
acdeg c−
acdfg e+
acefg c−
adefg b+
bcdef g+
bcdeg c−
bcdfg e+
bcefg c−
bdefg a+
cdefg c−
abcdef b−
abcdeg b−
abcdfg e+
abcefg b−
abdefg d−
acdefg c−
bcdefg c−
abcdefg b−
Lemma 2. For the veto rule r, if there exists Γ = 〈X,P, r, PX〉 with no NE, then there
exists Γ ′ = 〈X ′, P ′, r, PX′〉 with no NE, where |X ′| = |X |+ 1.
Proof. Take Γ with no NE, withX = {x1, . . . , xm}, and n votersn odd. Let s(P, Y, xi)
denote the veto score of xi in P ↓Y . Let X ′ = X ∪ {xm+1}, and Q be the following
3n-voter profile: for each vote Pi in P we have two identical votes Qi, Q′i obtained
from Pi by adding xm+1 in the bottom position, and one vote Q′′i obtained from Pi by
adding xm+1 in the top position. Finally, let PX
′ be the candidate profile obtained by
adding xm+1 at the bottom of every ranking of a candidate xi, i < m, and whatever
ranking for xm+1. Let Γ ′ = 〈X ′, P ′, r, PX
′
〉
Let Y ⊆ X and Y ′ = Y ∪ {xm+1}.
For all xi ∈ Y , s(Q, Y, xi) = 3s(P, Y \{xm+1}, xi); therefore, r(Q↓Y ) = r(P ↓Y ).
Because Y is not an NE for Γ , some candidate xi ∈ X has a profitable deviation from
Y in Γ , thus xi has a profitable deviation in from Y in Γ ′ too: Y is not an NE in Γ ′.
For all xi ∈ Y , s(Q, Y ′, xi) = s(P, Y \{xm+1}, xi)+2n ≥ 2n, while s(Q, Y ′, xm+1) =
n; therefore, r(Q↓Y ′) = r(P ↓Y ), and a profitable deviation from Y in Γ is also a prof-
itable deviation in from Y ′ in Γ ′ too: Y ′ is not an NE in Γ ′. 
Appendix B: ILP formulation
Let S be the set of states, and A(s) be the set of agents who are candidates in state s.
Note that |S| = 2|X|.
Choice functions without any NE. We introduce a binary variable wsi, meaning that
agent i wins in state s. We add constraints enforcing that there is a single winner in
each state s :
∀i ∈ X, ∀s ∈ S : ws,i ∈ {0, 1} (1)
∀s ∈ S :
∑
i∈X ws,i = 1 (2)
∀s ∈ S, ∀i ∈ X 6∈ A(s) : ws,i = 0 (3)
Now, we introduce constraints related to deviations. We denote by D(s) the set of
possible deviations from state s (state where a single agent’s candidacy differs from s).
We also denote by a(s, t) an agent potentially deviating from s to t. We define binary
variables ds,t indicating a deviation from a state s to a state t. In each state, there must
be at least one deviation otherwise this state must be a NE.
∀s ∈ S, ∀t ∈ S : ds,t ∈ {0, 1} (4)
∀s ∈ S :
∑
t∈D(s) ds,t ≥ 1 (5)
Now we introduce constraints related to the preferences of the candidates. For this
purpose, we introduce a binary variable pi,j,k, meaning that agent i prefers candidate
j over candidate k. If there is indeed a deviation from s to t, the deviating agent must
prefer the winner of the state new state compared to the winner of the previous state:
∀s ∈ S, ∀t ∈ D(s), ∀i ∈ X, ∀j ∈ X : ws,i + wt,j + ds,t − pa(s,t),j,i ≤ 2 (6)
Finally we ensure that the preferences are irreflexive and transitive, and respect the
constraint of being self-supported.
∀i ∈ X, ∀j ∈ X : pi,j,j = 0 (7)
∀a ∈ X, ∀i ∈ X∀j ∈ X, ∀k ∈ X : pa,i,j + pa,j,k − pa,i,k ≤ 1 (8)
∀i ∈ X, ∀j ∈ X : pi,i,j = 1 (9)
Constraints for Borda. We introduce a new integer variable Ni,j to represent the num-
ber of voters preferring i over j in the weighted tournament. We first make sure that the
values of Ni,j are consistent throughout the weighted tournament.
∀i ∈ X, ∀j ∈ X, ∀k ∈ X, ∀l ∈ X : Ni,j +Nj,i = Nk,l +Nl,k (10)
In each state, when agent i wins, we must make sure that her total amount of points
is the highest among all agents in this state (note that i can simply tie with agents it has
priority over in the tie-breaking; we omit this for the sake of readability):
∀s ∈ S, ∀i ∈ A(s), ∀k ∈ A(s) \ {i} :
(1− ws,i)×M +
∑
j∈A(s)\{i}
Ni,j >
∑
j∈A(s)\{k}
Nk,j (11)
Here M is an arbitrary large value, used to relax the constraint when ws,i is 0.
